You Are Not a Subject, You Are the World
A transcendental idea from the philosophy of consciousness
The obvious explanation for the world we experience is that the world, with its bright green leaves, rough stones and icy rivers is out there, and we apprehend it through our senses.
But this view of reality, which philosophers call naïve realism, feels shaky on scrutiny.
For, when we see a bright green leaf, can we really say that the bright green belongs to the leaf and not to our experience?
We know now that dogs probably see the leaf as a dull yellow or brown, and bats may experience the leaf through sonic textures pertaining to its shape. Insects may see in the leaf a dozen colours we’ve never seen¹.
The best way to account for the differences in the ways that the objects of the world can be experienced is to say that the objects do not themselves have the qualities that we experience, but rather that the inherent qualities of the objects are received and apprehended by our sense receptors in a particular way.
The leaf is not bright green objectively. Rather, the leaf has objective properties such that the light it reflects is perceived by our retinas as bright green.
